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PHILOSOPHY IX THE LIGHT OF SCIENCE
Prof. G. H. Mead's "Philosophy of the Present"
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
THERE are philosophers and philosophers. The late Professor
George Herbert Mead—whom, by the way, the writer knew
intimately for over thirty years—was a philosopher and an effective
and inspiring professor of philosophy, but he was also a metaphy-
sician and a life-long student of the exact sciences. His position in
American philosophy was quite unique, therefore, and his sudden
death last year was a real tragedy in the realm of American thought
and speculation.
It is fortunate, however, that Prof. Mead, who was an extreme-
ly modest man, with an overdeveloped faculty for self-criticism,
was invited to deliver the third series of lectures on the Paul Carus
Foundation. The volume comprising these lectures, as well as some
additional essays, now published by The Open Court Publishing
Company, under the title ''The Philosophy of the Present" gives the
public interested in philosophy, ethics and social psychology a fair
and adequate summary of some fundamental and fruitful aspects
of Prof. Mead's total contribution to American philosophy.
To understand and appreciate the importance of this volume, it
is necessary to bear in mind the interesting fact that Mr. Mead was
profoundlv impressed and influenced by modern science and modern
metaphysics, and felt that the moral and social implications and
bearings of such revolutionary ideas as Relativity, the Quantum
theory, Indeterminism, Emergent Evolution, ought to be traced and
elucidated for the benefit of philosophy and progressive thought
and action.
Prof. Mead did not agree with Huxley that there was an ir-
reconcilable conflict between Nature and civilized Humanity. He
was certain that any notable advance in the interpretation of na-
ture, or reality, must find reflection in the interpretation of human
phenomena.
It cannot be truthfully said that Prof. Mead succeeded in con-
structing a synthetic philosophical system based on modern science
and modern metaphysics. He made no such claim, and perhaps the
time has not yet come for so stupendous and ambitious an attempt.
We must not overlook the collapse of Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy.
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Prof. Mead assured the writer that Spencer was right in contending
that philosophy today had no function or mission other than that
of co-ordinating, fusing and building up a synthesis resting on and
fashioned by the established truths and generalizations of all the
sciences. But Spencer was hasty and premature, and Prof. Mead
profited by the mistakes, crudities and arbitrary, illogical conclu-
sions of that thinker. What we have in "The Philosophy of the
Present"—the Carus lectures and supplementary chapters or frag-
ments—is a valuable, seminal series of propositions, hints and sug-
gestions that challenge attention and demand further study and
elaboration. In other words, Prof. Mead has left us a number of
arresting, well-defined problems, together with pregnant concep-
tions, intimations and a definite point of view.
The subject-matter of Prof. Mead's lectures, as Prof. IMurphy,
in his admirable and lucid introduction to the volume, points out, is
divided as follows : First, there is a theory about the nature of time
and emergence ; second, there is a theory about Relativity and its
social implications, and, thirdly, a theory of emergence as social
and of sociality as a character of emergent evolution.
It may be stated at once that Prof. IMead's work has conferred
new dignity upon and considerably enhanced the philosophical pres-
tige of Pragmatism.
Take the following passage from the chapter on "The Implica-
tions of the Self"
:
"The functional boundaries of the present are those of its un-
dertaking—of what we are doing. The pasts and futures indicated
by such activity belong to the present. They arise out of it and are
tested and criticised by it. The undertakings belong however, w'ith
varying degrees of intimacy, within larger activities, so that we
seldom have the sense of a set of isolated presents. . . .
"For instance, the present history of the sun is relevant to the
undertaking of unraveling the atom and, given another analysis of
the atom, the sun will have another history and the universe will
be launched into a new future. The pasts and the futures are impli-
cations of what is being undertaken and carried out in our labora-
tories."
Other writers have emphasized the dependence of the past upon
the present in the sense that our aippraisal of past events—laws,
reforms, revolutions, inventions—undergoes changes and, there-
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fore, our pictures of the past vary. Prof. Mead, plows deeper and
considers the "functional" boundaries of the present.
But the extension of the present into the past and the past into
the present does not preclude the idea of novelty and emerg^ence.
The past does ncjt fitUy determine the present, "liecause," says
Prof. Mead, "an animal is both alive and a i)art of a phsysico-chemi-
cal world, that life is an emergent and extends its influence to the
environment about it. It is because the conscious individual is both
an animal and is also able to look before and after that conscious-
ness emerg^es with the meanino^s and values with which it informs
the world."
Perhaps Prof. Mead's most original and dariiig generalization
concerns sociality as a principle. Under Newtonian relativity, he
shows, sociality was confined to thought, but modern science tends
to prove that there is sociality in nature—in this sense, that "the
emergence of novelty requires that objects be at once both in the
old system and in that which arises from the new," for "relativity
reveals a situation within which the object must be contemporan-
eously in different systems to be what it is in either." And, clearly,
if we postulate, on the one hand, sociality throughout nature and,
on the other, emergent evolution, the claim is not too extravagant
that the highest and finest product of the whole evolutionary pro-
cess is the ideal of human solidarity, human co-operation, justice
and altruism.
"The appearance of mind," says Prof. Mead "is only the culmin-
ation of that sociality which is found throughout the universe, its
culmination lying in the fact that the organism, by occupying the
attitudes of others, can occupy its own attitude in the role of
another."
Prof. ]\Iead continues the argument thus
:
We human beings are members of societies, or systematic or-
ders of individuals, and our activities are diflferentiated—perhaps
excessivelv differentiated—under our present civilization. But the
social structure is reflected in each of us. It is l^ecause of this struc-
ture that we can take the parts of others while taking our own re-
spective parts. There results the part "of the generalized other."
Thought, ideas, communication, imply individual realization and
spontaneous, as well as deliberate, manifestation of generalized
otherness.
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Thus, according to Prof. Mead, there is no break in evolution.
The science of social psychology continues and carries on the work
of individual psychology, of animal psychology, of biology and of
physics, mathematics and astro'-physics. True, we must not over-
rate our human achievements. We still have long distances to
traverse. But we know our goal, and we are justified in affirming
that science and philosophy countenance that goal. "If we can bring
people together," writes Prof. Mead, "so that they can enter into
each other's lives, they will inevitably have a common object, which
will control their common conduct."
Examples of the gratifying, if limited, success of the effort to
bring people together and substitute beneficial co-operation for
wasteful antagonism Prof. Mead finds in the league of nations, the
world court, the Geneva arms conferences, and like developments.
Thus the metaphysician and the philosopher in Prof. Mead's
rich personality find themselves in harmony with the humanitarian
and pragmatist. It will not do to allege that Prof. Mead reached
conclusions by the process of "wishful thinking," or that he knew
in advance the results he was bound to reach. Those who knew him
well never doubted his intellectual integrity or his interest in pure
science. If his strictly scientific studies had led him to the pessi-
mistic conclusion that moral progress, human brotherhood, true in-
ternationalism were idle dreams and illusions, he would not have
hesitated to accept the painful truth. But Einstein, Minkowski,
Planck, Whitehead, Bergson, Meyerson and other thinkers whose
thought challenged his attention convinced him that a correct, pro-
found interpretation of Nature in its totality, and of the actual re-
lations between the present, in which we live and move, and the
past and future, furnish adequate support for his theory of the
emergence and growth of sociality—of the certainty that the human
self, which is a social self, will increasingly identify itself with
larger groups and will find itself completed and fulfilled in that
larger self.
It is the duty of American thought to test, verify and expand
Prof. Mead's stimulating contributions to philosophy and social
psychology.
